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Combining genomic and epidemiological data to
compare the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2
variants Alpha and Iota
Mary E. Petrone 1,15 ✉, Jessica E. Rothman1,15, Mallery I. Breban 1, Isabel M. Ott1, Alexis Russell 2,
Erica Lasek-Nesselquist2,3, Hamada Badr 4, Kevin Kelly5, Greg Omerza5, Nicholas Renzette5,
Anne E. Watkins 1, Chaney C. Kalinich1, Tara Alpert1, Anderson F. Brito1, Rebecca Earnest1, Irina R. Tikhonova6,
Christopher Castaldi6, John P. Kelly2, Matthew Shudt2, Jonathan Plitnick2,3, Erasmus Schneider2,3,
Steven Murphy7, Caleb Neal7, Eva Laszlo7, Ahmad Altajar7, Claire Pearson8, Anthony Muyombwe8,
Randy Downing8, Jafar Razeq8, Linda Niccolai1, Madeline S. Wilson9, Margaret L. Anderson1, Jianhui Wang10,
Chen Liu10, Pei Hui10, Shrikant Mane6, Bradford P. Taylor11, William P. Hanage 11, Marie L. Landry12,
David R. Peaper12, Kaya Bilguvar6,13, Joseph R. Fauver 1, Chantal B. F. Vogels 1, Lauren M. Gardner4,
Virginia E. Pitzer 1, Kirsten St. George 2,3, Mark D. Adams 5 & Nathan D. Grubaugh 1,14 ✉

SARS-CoV-2 variants shaped the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic and the discourse
around effective control measures. Evaluating the threat posed by a new variant is essential
for adapting response efforts when community transmission is detected. In this study, we
compare the dynamics of two variants, Alpha and Iota, by integrating genomic surveillance
data to estimate the effective reproduction number (Rt) of the variants. We use Connecticut,
United States, in which Alpha and Iota co-circulated in 2021. We ﬁnd that the Rt of these
variants were up to 50% larger than that of other variants. We then use phylogeography to
show that while both variants were introduced into Connecticut at comparable frequencies,
clades that resulted from introductions of Alpha were larger than those resulting from Iota
introductions. By monitoring the dynamics of individual variants throughout our study period,
we demonstrate the importance of routine surveillance in the response to COVID-19.
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T

he emergence of novel SARS-CoV-2 variants has shaped
the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic1–3 and illustrated the role of genomic epidemiology in facilitating an
appropriate, effective, and timely public health response4. In
particular, genomic epidemiology can determine the source and
frequency of new variant introductions into a community, thus
indicating where additional surveillance is needed. However, this
assessment requires the prior establishment of a robust genomic
surveillance system. Once community transmission is documented, the efﬁcacy of control methods should be re-evaluated by
assessing the public health risk posed by the variant in comparison to other variants in circulation. This second objective is
particularly challenging because factors other than the virus
genotype inﬂuence its transmission and spread5–7. Speciﬁcally,
competition between virus lineages, human behavior, and local
levels of immunity could impact the relative success of a new
variant compared to its predecessors. Therefore, to measure
relative differences in intrinsic viral properties such as immune
evasion and replication rates, we should compare lineages that
have emerged concurrently in the same human and virus population as the variant under scrutiny. Instances in which these
criteria are met are both rare and exceptionally informative.
At the beginning of 2021 two variants of public health concern
synchronously emerged in Connecticut, a United States (US) state
with high rates of SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance. SARSCoV-2 variant Iota (lineage B.1.526) was detected in New York in
December 20208. Shortly thereafter, cases of Alpha (lineage
B.1.1.7), the variant ﬁrst characterized in the United Kingdom,
were identiﬁed in the northeastern US. Due to evidence collected
in the United Kingdom that this variant was more transmissible
than other lineages, Alpha was expected to become dominant in
the US by March9–11. Instead, Iota co-circulated in New York
with Alpha and may have slowed the decline of COVID-19
incidence in New York City12. Both variants were initially
detected in Connecticut within the ﬁrst two weeks of January
2021, likely introduced by infected travelers, and continued to cocirculate in the state for months10.
In this study, we assess the relative dynamics of Alpha and Iota
by combining epidemiological and genomic data collected in
Connecticut between January and May 2021. We ﬁrst measure
the relative transmissibility, which we herein deﬁne as, collectively, the intrinsic viral properties that give rise to secondary
infections, of these variants by modeling their growth rates and
time-varying effective reproduction numbers following their
emergence. Both metrics indicate that Alpha and Iota were up to
50% more transmissible than other lineages that circulated in the
same population. Interestingly, these ﬁndings are consistent with
the relationship we observed in New York City where Iota was
established before Alpha. We next estimate the timing, number,
and clade size following sustained introductions of each variant
into Connecticut to determine whether the apparent ﬁtness
advantage we observed for Alpha could be attributed to a higher
rate of introductions over our study period rather than higher
ﬁtness. We use discrete phylogeography to infer the source and
number of introductions for each variant and ﬁnd that both were
introduced at comparable rates, but the size of clades precipitated
by introductions of Alpha were on average larger than those
formed from introductions of Iota. The concordance of our epidemiological and phylodynamic results indicate that Alpha had a
ﬁtness advantage over Iota when potentially confounding factors
were controlled.
Results
Rapid rise in Alpha and Iota prevalence in Connecticut and
New York City. The rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha
2

in the United Kingdom13 and Iota in New York City12,14 suggested that these variants have an advantage over other SARSCoV-2 lineages. Both variants are deﬁned by key amino acid
substitutions in the spike protein that may contribute to this
advantage. We therefore hypothesized that Alpha and Iota would
become dominant in Connecticut soon after they emerged. To
test this hypothesis, we measured the daily frequencies and
growth rates of Alpha and Iota in Connecticut and compared
these patterns to those observed in New York City (Fig. 1). Our
analysis revealed that Alpha and Iota displaced nearly all other
lineages circulating in both regions within three months of
emergence. Moreover, the frequency of Alpha grew at a faster rate
than Iota.
Unlike the situation in New York City, which may be the origin
of Iota, Alpha and Iota emerged concurrently in Connecticut
through infected travelers. Connecticut is a state in the northeast
US, bordered by Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New York
(Fig. 1a, map). These states experienced synchronous waves of
COVID-19 incidence throughout the pandemic (Fig. 1a, graphs).
We ﬁrst detected Alpha in Connecticut on January 6, 2021
(sample collection date) in New Haven County10, and we
detected the ﬁrst Iota genome soon after on January 14, 2021.
Due to the concurrent introductions of these variants into New
Haven County, we assumed that any observed differences in
ﬁtness between the two variants could not be attributed to a pure
founder effect.
The nomenclature used to deﬁne the Iota clade has changed
throughout the course of the pandemic. For a brief period, the
Iota lineage B.1.526 was partially split into two sublineages,
B.1.526.1 and B.1.526.2, to account for occurrence of three key
amino acid substitutions in the spike gene: L452R, S477N, and
E484K (Supplementary Fig. 1a)12,14–17. However, the sublineages
had poor phylogenetic resolution and were difﬁcult to consistently classify by pangolin18. As a result, the sublineage
designations were removed and all sequences within this clade
were reclassiﬁed as “B.1.526”. While B.1.526 sequences with
different combinations of L452R, S477N, and E484K substitutions
may have different phenotypes, we previously did not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant differences among these genotypes at reducing
neutralizing antibody titers following vaccination19. Furthermore,
we found that the B.1.526 genotype frequencies were relatively
stable over time in Connecticut (Supplementary Fig. 1b),
suggesting that they did not have signiﬁcant differences in
transmissibility. We therefore elected to analyze the dynamics of
the B.1.526 genotypes collectively, which we hereafter refer to
as Iota.
To compare the relative growth rates of Alpha and Iota over
time, we collected and sequenced 2,951 whole SARS-CoV-2
genomes from Connecticut between November 30, 2020 and May
9, 2021 using an unbiased sampling approach. Speciﬁcally, we
excluded genomes that were targeted for sequencing because of
spike-gene target failure or any other anomaly. We assigned
PANGO lineages to each genome20 and created a general lineage
classiﬁcation with three categories: ‘Alpha’ (lineage B.1.1.7), ‘Iota’
(lineage B.1.256), or ‘other’. The ‘other’ lineages primarily include
lineages B.1.2, B.1.517, B.1.575, and B.1.243, but they also include
low frequencies of several ‘Variants Being Monitored’ (VBMs)
and Variants of Interest (VOIs; Supplementary Table 1). We
calculated a rolling 7-day average for each general lineage
classiﬁcation to mitigate the impact of daily reporting trends.
In southern Connecticut, Alpha and Iota collectively rose to
above 50% prevalence by March 2021, but the relative prevalence
of these variants differed across the region (Fig. 1c). Due to the
close proximity of New Haven and Fairﬁeld counties to New York
City and the large volume of travelers between New York City
and southern Connecticut, we hypothesized that the frequency
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Fig. 1 Alpha and Iota dominated the circulating SARS-CoV-2 populations in Connecticut and New York City in early 2021. a Trends in COVID-19
incidence were consistent across northeastern states throughout the pandemic. (map) Connecticut (teal) is bordered by New York, Rhode Island, and
Massachusetts. New York City is less than 50 miles from Fairﬁeld County. Weekly COVID-19 incidence was tabulated according to the Johns Hopkins
COVID-19 portal (https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19). Shapeﬁle source: United States Census Bureau. b New Haven County led the state in
the percentage of COVID-19 cases sequenced between November 30, 2020 and May 9, 2021 (3.33%). During this period, 0.51% of COVID-19 cases in
New York City were sequenced. Genomes that were collected through targeted variant screening (e.g., spike-gene target failure) were excluded from this
analysis. Shapeﬁle source: the Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental Protection (DEEP) Geographic Information Systems Open Data
Website. c Together, Alpha and Iota variants displaced nearly all other SARS-CoV-2 lineages in New Haven County (n = 2086), Fairﬁeld County (n = 612),
and New York City (n = 4528). The lineages of sequenced viruses were assigned using pangolin v.2.4.2. The lineages B.1.526, B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2 were
assigned to the general lineage category ‘Iota’. We calculated a 7-day rolling average for the proportion of Alpha, Iota, and ‘other’ SARS-CoV-2 lineages
sequenced in our dataset. d Daily variant incidence estimated by ﬁtting a logistic growth model to the daily sequenced variant frequencies shown in c. This
analysis was completed using Rv.4.0.1. Line colors correspond to the legend in c. e Daily growth rates of variants estimated using the logistic growth model
shown in d. Bar colors correspond to the legend in c.

patterns in Connecticut would reﬂect those observed in New York
City. We therefore modeled the logistic growth of each variant
across locations (Fig. 1d). While the growth rates of Alpha and
Iota were comparable and consistently higher than all other
lineages (Fig. 1e), we observed heterogeneity in the relative
growth of these variants. The estimated logistic growth rate of
Alpha was twice that of Iota in New Haven County (Alpha =
0.042, Iota = 0.021) and New York City (Alpha = 0.035, Iota =
0.016). The rate of Alpha growth was 1.37 times that of Iota in
Fairﬁeld County (Alpha = 0.037, Iota = 0.028). These ﬁndings
suggest that Alpha and Iota had a ﬁtness advantage over their
predecessors, and, once established, Alpha may have spread more
quickly than Iota. This pattern was particularly noticeable in New
York City, where Iota emerged ﬁrst but increased in frequency
more slowly than Alpha (Fig. 1c).

Evidence that Alpha is more transmissible than Iota. The
relative changes in frequency and growth rates reﬂected by our
sequencing data indicated that the growth rates of Alpha and Iota
outpaced those of other co-circulating SARS-CoV-2 lineages
(Fig. 1). They also provided some evidence that the prevalence of
Alpha increased at a faster rate than that of Iota in three different
populations. However, these observations did not account for
COVID-19 incidence in each population. Over the duration of
our study period, the weekly number of reported COVID-19
cases in Connecticut declined, peaking at 53 cases per 10,000
residents and falling to 9 cases per 10,000 residents with ﬂuctuations in between. To more accurately measure the relative
transmissibility of Alpha and Iota, we combined the frequency
estimates from our genomic data with daily estimated COVID-19
infections and estimated the effective reproduction numbers (Rt),
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Fig. 2 Alpha and Iota had a larger effective reproduction number (Rt) than other circulating lineages in the ﬁrst half of 2021. a, d Daily incidence and
full vaccination rates (2 weeks post last dose) of Alpha, Iota, and other circulating lineages in New Haven County (a) and New York City (d). Estimated
daily infections were assigned to one of three lineage categories (‘Alpha’, ‘Iota’, and ‘other’) according to the 7-day rolling average of variant frequency
among sequenced cases. ‘Iota’ includes the sublineages B.1.526, B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2. b, e Time-varying effective reproduction numbers (Rt) were
calculated using the R package EpiEstim. An Rt value above 1 indicates that an infected individual will, on average, infect more than 1 additional person. We
assumed a serial interval of mean 5.2 days and standard deviation of 4 days for all lineages. 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles are shown as dotted lines. c, f Ratios
of estimated Rt between January 24 and April 24, 2021. The mean and 95% CI for the scatter plots are shown in black.

which quantiﬁes the average number of secondary cases from a
primary infection, for each variant (Fig. 2).
Rt ratios of co-circulating variants reﬂect intrinsic differences
in transmissibility. Variant-speciﬁc factors such as replication rate
and immune escape interact with population-level factors
including human behavior and levels of immunity to inﬂuence
Rt estimates. By taking the ratio of Rt estimates of co-circulating
variants in a given population, we can control for population
effects. Therefore, using Rt ratios calculated for New Haven
County, Connecticut, we estimated that both Alpha and Iota were
up to ~50% more transmissible than other circulating lineages
(Fig. 2c). We obtained consistent albeit noisier results in New
York City, providing further evidence that Alpha was more
transmissible than Iota (Fig. 2f).
We estimated Rt for Alpha and Iota by extrapolating the
variant frequencies among sequenced cases to the total number of
estimated infections in New Haven County (Fig. 2a). To estimate
the number of infections in this population, we used the R
package covidestim21. We selected New Haven County because
we sequenced a higher percentage of cases compared to other
counties in Connecticut (Fig. 1b), providing us with better
estimates. We assumed that the 7-day rolling average of Alpha
and Iota in our dataset was representative of the true prevalence
of these variants in the population because these datasets were
compiled using genomes collected from the same sources.
Therefore, we assumed that any biases introduced through
subsampling would be systematic across all lineages. However, we
also calculated a Jeffreys interval for daily variant frequencies and
used the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles to compute Rt and improve
the robustness of our analysis (Supplementary Fig. 2).
In New Haven County, our Rt estimates for Alpha and Iota
followed similar decreasing trajectories as COVID-19 vaccination
rates increased, though they consistently had a higher Rt than
4

other circulating lineages (Fig. 2b). The Rt for both Alpha and
Iota were above 1 between February and the end of April, when
fully vaccinated rates reached ~25%. An Rt value above 1
indicates that on average an infected individual infects more than
one additional person. The Rt estimates for ‘other’ lineages fell
below 1 in early January. Notably, the Rt for Iota decreased to
below 1 about one week earlier than that for Alpha (Fig. 2b). To
directly compare the transmissibility of Alpha and Iota, we
calculated the ratio of Rt for each lineage over time (Fig. 2c). Once
our estimates stabilized around the middle of February, the Rt of
Alpha and Iota were consistently higher than that of other
lineages (Alpha range: 0.986–1.51, Iota range: 1.122–1.525)
(Fig. 2c, f). The ratio of Rt estimates calculated using the lower
and upper quantiles of our Jeffreys intervals also exhibited this
pattern (Supplementary Fig. 2). We observed a similar relationship in New York City, though with larger ﬂuctuations (Alpha
range: 0.75–1.71, Iota range: 0.80–1.47). The consistency of these
ﬁndings suggests that both variants were more transmissible than
other circulating lineages even when Iota emerged before Alpha.
To assess the impact of reporting delays on these estimates, we
compared daily Rt estimates in New Haven County assuming 0 to
7 days of reporting lags and found that our estimates for Alpha
remained stable, while those for Iota ﬂuctuated slightly across our
study period (Supplementary Fig. 3).
Association of Alpha introductions with larger phylogenetic
clusters than Iota introductions. We next considered the possibility that the apparent increased transmissibility of Alpha
compared to Iota was due to the number and timing of the
introductions of each variant into Connecticut. More frequent
introductions of Alpha could artiﬁcially inﬂate our Rt estimates
(Fig. 2). To assess this possibility, we used a Bayesian phylogeographic method to quantify the number, timing, and source of

COMMUNICATIONS BIOLOGY | (2022)5:439 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-022-03347-3 | www.nature.com/commsbio

ARTICLE

COMMUNICATIONS BIOLOGY | https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-022-03347-3

a)

Alpha
New York/New Jersey
International
Domestic
Connecticut

1 month

1 month

2020-Nov

b)

2020-Dec

2021-Jan

2021-Feb

2021-Apr

2021-Mar

2020-Dec

2021-Jan

2021-Feb

2021-Mar

Iota
New York/New Jersey
International
Domestic
Connecticut

1 month

1 month

2020-Dec

2021-Jan

2021-Feb

2021-Mar

c)
10

New York/New Jersey
International
Domestic

15
10

2021-Jan

New York/New Jersey
Domestic
International

Iota

5

2021-Feb

2021-Mar

e)

50

median:
3

45

5
0
20

2020-Dec

Alpha
Total no. introductions

15
No. introductions No. introductions

2021-Apr

d)

Cluster size (log10)

2020-Nov

40
35

0.845

0.650

Alpha

Iota

2

1

30

0
2020-Dec

2021-Jan

2021-Feb

2021-March

2021-April

25

0

Alpha

Iota
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observed introductions of both variants into Connecticut (Fig. 3).
We found that Alpha was not introduced more often into the
state than Iota. Rather, the clusters resulting from each introduction were on average larger than those produced by Iota
introductions. These observations are in agreement with our Rt
estimates and further support the likelihood that Alpha spread
more rapidly than Iota.
To begin our phylogeographic analysis, we combined our
SARS-CoV-2 genomic data with randomly sampled publicly
available Alpha and Iota genomes (gisaid.org) from outside of
Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, normalizing by reported
deaths per location (see Methods). We did this independently 5
times for each variant to account for any potential biases from the
subsampling process (~17,000 and ~13,000 genomes for each
Alpha and Iota subsample, respectively; Supplementary Table 2),
and constructed the 10 corresponding time-resolved trees with
TreeTime22. We next performed discrete phylogeographic
reconstruction over the 10 time-resolved trees in BEAST23,24.
We inferred the ancestral geographic states according to four
discrete geographic categories: Connecticut, New York/New
Jersey, domestic, and international. We chose to combine New
York and New Jersey into one region because of the large volume
of commuters and visitors who travel from northern New Jersey
to New York City.
Due to the notably different geographic distribution of these
two variants (Fig. 3a, b), we expected the source of introductions
for each to also differ. Because Iota was ﬁrst identiﬁed in New
York and the majority of genomes from this variant family were
sequenced in New York, we hypothesized New York would be the
main source of Iota introductions into Connecticut. Alpha spread
widely in the United Kingdom and Europe, and the ﬁrst case of
Alpha in Connecticut was associated with international travel25,
indicating that early introduction would likely come from
international sources. We anticipated that international sources
would drive the initial introductions of Alpha into Connecticut
until this variant was established in the US.
We found that the sources and size of Alpha and Iota sustained
introductions differed between variants and throughout the study
period (Fig. 3c–e). We deﬁned a sustained introduction as a
transition from a location outside of Connecticut into Connecticut in which (1) the resulting clade contained at least 3 tips and
(2) the posterior probability of the ancestral, outside-Connecticut
node was at least 0.7. As we expected, New York/New Jersey was
a main source of introductions of Iota into Connecticut,
accounting for all but one of the 40 independent introductions
(Fig. 3c–e). The sources of introductions of Alpha were
heterogeneous, including international and domestic sources
throughout the study period (Fig. 3c–e). The relatively limited
role of New York/New Jersey in the spread of Alpha into
Connecticut may be due to the lower prevalence of this variant in
New York City for the majority of our study period (Fig. 1c). Our
phylogeographic analysis also revealed that, although Alpha was
introduced slightly less frequently than Iota (Fig. 3d), Alpha
introductions led to larger clusters (Fig. 3e). These patterns were
consistent across all ﬁve phylodynamic replicates and with our
estimates of Rt suggesting that Alpha had a ﬁtness advantage over
Iota (Supplementary Fig. 4, Fig. 2c).
Discussion
In this study, we quantiﬁed the relative ﬁtness of two SARS-CoV2 variants of public health concern, Alpha and Iota, that cocirculated in New Haven, Connecticut, at the beginning of 2021.
Our Rt estimates indicate that both Alpha and Iota likely had a
ﬁtness advantage over other lineages, while our phylogenetic data
suggest Alpha was more transmissible than Iota (Figs. 2, 3).
6

Importantly, we were able to control for population-level factors
that may inﬂuence variant transmissibility by studying contemporaneous variant dynamics in a well-deﬁned population.
These conclusions were consistent with those of our phylogeographic analysis (Fig. 3), the typical albeit more computationallyintensive method for evaluating the dynamics of virus transmission and spread. Our analytical approach, which measures
changes in frequencies and estimates the effective reproduction
number for individual variants, is more informative than the
current practice of tracking variant prevalence because it accounts
for both the change in lineage frequencies and the number of
incident cases. Moreover, it can be used to monitor the epidemiological dynamics of variants that have since emerged27.
To demonstrate this, we also analyzed the dynamics of Alpha
and Iota in New York City, where both variants also cocirculated. Our results were consistent with those from Connecticut (Fig. 2) but had some discrepancies with previous reports
of relative growth rates in New York City. Speciﬁcally, West et al.
reported that Iota with the spike E484K substitution was growing
at a faster rate than Alpha in New York City between December
2020 and March 202112. We also observed this rapid rise in Iota
prevalence during that time period (Fig. 1d); however, we found
that the growth rate of Iota slowed shortly thereafter (Fig. 1d),
and Alpha became the dominant circulating lineage in April
(Fig. 1c). Moreover, we estimated that the effective reproduction
number of Alpha was equal to or greater than that of Iota by
March (Fig. 2e), an early indicator of the eventual rise in Alpha
prevalence a few months later. This second ﬁnding is particularly
crucial because it illustrates that while variant frequencies at
speciﬁc time points may not be indicative of variant ﬁtness, the
changes in these frequencies can reveal relative variant transmission dynamics when combined with daily incidence data.
The epidemiological ﬁndings from our case study also have
broader public health implications as new SARS-CoV-2 variants
continue to emerge worldwide. The sources of introductions of
novel variants reﬂect their global distribution (Fig. 3a–c), which
will likely change over time. This heterogeneity poses a serious
obstacle to control and prevention efforts because it limits the
efﬁcacy of policies that target speciﬁc points of entry. For variants
that are prevalent on multiple continents like Alpha and, more
recently, Delta and Omicron, testing, contact tracing, and vaccination campaigns within communities will likely prove more
efﬁcient in limiting their spread than targeting a speciﬁc subset of
travelers. Once local transmission of a new variant has been
established, assessing the public health threat is both challenging
and necessarily retrospective. However, a robust genomic surveillance infrastructure coupled with the application of a framework like ours would enable the routine monitoring of variant
epidemiology. The phylodynamic methods we applied in this
study can be run on a desktop computer in a few hours, making
the collation of representative datasets the rate limiting step.
Expanding genomic surveillance efforts would remove this barrier
and promote a rapid and efﬁcient response to outbreaks caused
by new variants.
There were some limitations to the epidemiological ﬁndings we
have presented. First, we were not able to directly measure the
secondary attack rates of individuals infected with Alpha or one
of the Iota sublineages. Collecting this information requires
extensive contact tracing and sequencing of all secondary infections that are not available in Connecticut. Instead, we assumed
that biases introduced by the method we employed in this study
would be systematic across SARS-CoV-2 lineages so that estimates of the relative transmissibility of Alpha and Iota would be
unaffected. Similarly, although we allowed the generation interval
times to vary in our Rt estimations, we did not explicitly account
for potential differences in generation interval distributions
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between the two variants due to the limited data availability on
this point. However, we believe our estimates to be accurate
because we found that Alpha was ~50% more transmissible than
non-Iota lineages, and this is consistent with previously published
ﬁndings by Washington et al.11. Second, we did not evaluate the
individual dynamics of the previously designated Iota sublineages:
B.1.526, B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2. While there may be variation in
the Rt of the individual sublineages, we elected to capture the
reproduction number of Iota as per its designation by the WHO.
Third, we used a small subset of publicly available SARS-CoV-2
genomes for our phylodynamic analyses to make them computationally tractable. Incorporating a small proportion of available
data into our analyses may have introduced biases, but by
demonstrating the reproducibility of our ﬁndings with independent replicates (Supplementary Fig. 3), we substantially mitigated
this issue. The use of publicly available data also introduced the
potential for uncontrolled geographic sampling biases in our
phylogeographic analysis. However, because the majority of
available Connecticut genomes were generated at Yale University
or Jackson Laboratory, we assumed that biases would be systematic across variants. Fourth, performing phylogeographic
inference using a ﬁxed topology may overestimate the number of
introduction events because this method does not resolve polytomies. Finally, the scope of our study was limited to Connecticut
and, in some cases, New York City, which may impinge upon the
generalizability of our ﬁndings. However, our objective was to
directly compare the ﬁtness of Alpha and Iota, and Connecticut is
one of few locations with a robust genomic surveillance infrastructure where these variants emerged concurrently.
Here, we use genomic data to estimate the effective reproduction number of two co-circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants as a
measure of relative transmission and ﬁtness. By focusing on
Connecticut, this study directly compares the ﬁtness of Alpha and
Iota in a setting where they emerged concurrently. Our analysis of
Alpha and Iota dynamics in New York City not only corroborates
our ﬁndings in Connecticut, but also provides insight into the
SARS-CoV-2 populations circulating through the ConnecticutNew York corridor, which is an international travel hub. Moreover, our ﬁndings highlight that many factors inﬂuence a variant’s
success including the timing of introduction, the existing virus
population, host immunity, and advantageous amino acid substitutions. As new SARS-CoV-2 variants emerge, it will be critical
to assess the magnitude of the role that each of these elements
play in precipitating local outbreaks so that appropriate, effective,
and immediate steps may be taken to control further SARS-CoV-2
transmission.
Methods
Ethics
Yale university. The Institutional Review Board from the Yale University Human
Research Protection Program determined that the RT-qPCR testing and sequencing of de-identiﬁed remnant COVID-19 clinical samples obtained from clinical
partners conducted in this study is not research involving human subjects (IRB
Protocol ID: 2000028599).
Jackson laboratory. The Institutional Review Board of The Jackson Laboratory
determined that use of de-identiﬁed residual COVID-19 clinical samples obtained
from the Clinical Genomics Laboratory for RT-qPCR testing and sequencing for
this study is not research involving human subjects (IRB Determination: 2020NHSR-021).
New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center. Residual portions of
respiratory specimens from individuals who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by
RT-PCR were obtained from the Wadsworth Center and partnering clinical
laboratories. This work was approved by the New York State Department of Health
Institutional Review Board, under study numbers 02-054 and 07-022.
Reported COVID-19 case data. We used daily reported cases compiled by the
Johns Hopkins COVID-19 portal (https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19).
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We summed the number of incident cases by week by state for Massachusetts, New
York, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and we aggregated incident cases
by week by county for New Haven, Fairﬁeld, and Westchester. We visualized these
data using Prism v.9.0.2 (plots) and Rv.1.2 (maps). For the latter, we obtained the
shapeﬁles from the United States Census Bureau (east coast) and the Connecticut
Department of Energy & Environmental Protection (DEEP) Geographic Information
Systems Open Data Website (Connecticut).

SARS-CoV-2 sequencing and consensus generation
Yale university. We received clinical samples from conﬁrmed SARS-CoV-2 positive
individuals from routine testing provided by Yale New Haven Hospital, Yale
Pathology Laboratory, “Yale Campus Study”, Connecticut Department of Public
Health, and Murphy Medical Associates. These samples were sent as either nasal
swabs in viral transport media, raw saliva, or extracted and puriﬁed RNA. For the
former two, we extracted RNA from 300 µl of the original sample using the
MagMAX viral/pathogen nucleic acid isolation kit, eluting in 75 µl of elution
buffer. We tested the extracted nucleic acid using our ‘variant of concern’ RT-qPCR
assay to determine the SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA load28. Samples with cycle
thresholds <35 were prepared for sequencing using the Illumina COVIDSeq Test
RUO version to synthesize cDNA, and generate and tagment amplicons. Amplicons were pooled and cleaned before quantiﬁcation with Qubit High Sensitivity
dsDNA kit. The resulting libraries were sequenced using a 2 × 100 or 2 × 150
approach on an Illumina NovaSeq at the Yale Center for Genomic Analysis. Each
sample was given at least 1 million reads. Samples were typically processed in sets
of 94 with negative controls incorporated during the RNA extraction, cDNA
synthesis, and amplicon generation steps.
Using BWA-MEM v.0.7.1529, we aligned reads to the Wuhan-Hu-1 reference
genomes (GenBank MN908937.3). With iVar v1.2.130 and SAMtools31, we
trimmed sequencing adapters, masked primer sequences, and called bases by
simple majority (>50% frequency) at each site to generate consensus genomes. An
ambiguous ‘N’ was used when fewer than 10 reads were present at a site. In all
cases, negative controls were analyzed and conﬁrmed to consist of at least 95% Ns.
We used pangolin v.2.4.218 to assign lineages20. Consensus genomes were uploaded
to GISAID.
Jackson laboratory. Clinical samples were received in The Jackson Laboratory
Clinical Genomics Laboratory (CGL) as part of a statewide COVID-19 surveillance
program, with the majority of samples representing asymptomatic screening of
nursing home and assisted living facility residents and staff. Total nucleic acids
were extracted from anterior nares swabs in viral transport media or saline (200 µl)
using the MagMAX Viral RNA Isolation kit (ThermoFisher) on a KingFisher Flex
puriﬁcation system. Samples were tested for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA
using the TaqPath COVID-19 Combo Kit (ThermoFisher). Samples with cycle
thresholds ≤30 for the N gene target were prepared for sequencing using the
Illumina COVIDSeq Test kit. Sequencing was performed on an Illumina NovaSeq
or NextSeq in the CGL. Data analysis was performed using the DRAGEN COVID
Lineage App in BaseSpace Sequence Hub. Sequences with >80% of bases with nonN basecalls and ≥1500-fold median coverage were considered successful and were
submitted to GISAID. Lineages were assigned using pangolin v.2.4.218 and the
most current version of the pangoLEARN assignment algorithm.
New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center. Respiratory swabs
positive for SARS-CoV-2 were sent to the Wadsworth Center from collaborating
clinical laboratories across New York State as part of an enhanced genomic surveillance program initiated by the New York State Department of Health in
December 2020. Specimens were required to have a real-time cycle threshold value
less than 30. Nucleic acid extraction was performed on a Roche MagNAPure 96
(Roche, Indianapolis, IN) and RNA was processed for whole genome sequencing
with a modiﬁed ARTIC3 protocol (http://artic.network/ncov-2019) in the Applied
Genomics Technology Core at the Wadsworth Center, by adding additional
ARTIC3 primers when poor ampliﬁcation efﬁciency was observed10. Lineage was
determined by GISAID using pangolin software18, updated June 7, 2021. Daily
relative frequency of variants within New York City was determined based on
sample collection date and patient residence within Bronx, Kings, New York,
Queens, or Richmond counties. Any specimens that were sequenced as a result of
pre-screening for speciﬁc mutations or clinical/epidemiological criteria were
removed from the analysis. Consensus genomes were uploaded to GISAID.

Percent of COVID-19 cases sequenced. To calculate the percent of cases
sequenced in each county, we tabulated the number of genomes collected from the
state with available county-level data. Though this level of geographic resolution
was only available for genomes sequenced by our laboratory and the Jackson
Laboratory for Genomic Medicine, these two sources have generated the vast
majority of genomes for the state of Connecticut. For New York City, NY, we used
genomes generated by the Wadsworth Center. Using the case data described above,
we summed the number of cases reported by each county between November 30,
2020 and May 9, 2021, and divided the total number of genomes generated for each
county within the same timeframe by that sum.
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Frequency of SARS-CoV-2 variants among sequenced cases. To assess the
frequency of circulating lineages, we selected genomes that were sequenced through
a non-biased sampling approach. Speciﬁcally, we excluded genomes that were
screened and sequenced through a targeted S-gene target failure surveillance system. As with the dataset we used to measure the percent of cases sequenced by
county, these genomes were generated by our laboratory, Jackson Laboratory, and
the Wadsworth Center. We organized these genomes into three categories using
Pangolin v.2.4.218: Alpha, Iota*, and ‘other’. We then tabulated the number of
genomes in each category by week and calculated the percent of the total number
of genomes for that week.
Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 variants among cases. We obtained estimates of
the distribution of cases attributed to each lineage category by multiplying the
frequency of that category by the number of cases reported in the same week. In
doing so, we assumed that the sequencing frequencies described above were
representative of the virus population circulating in New Haven and Fairﬁeld
counties, and New York City (all counties). We also assumed that the number of
reported cases for each county was representative of the true number of infections
in that region.
To account for any uncertainty in our assumption that the sampling frequencies
were representative of cases per county, we began by calculating p, a 7-day rolling
average for the proportion of sequenced cases for each lineage category. This
produced daily proportion estimates. To further account for any uncertainty, for
each p, we calculated a Jeffreys interval, which is a Bayesian, equal-tailed interval of
the form32:
quantile ¼ βðx þ 0:5; n  x þ 0:5Þ

ð1Þ

where β represents the beta distribution, x represents the 7-day rolling average of
sequences of a speciﬁc lineage, and n represents the 7-day rolling average of
sequences for all lineages. Our measure of interest, p, is calculated by x/n. The
Jeffreys intervals were calculated using the package “DescTools” in R v4.0.1.
Logistic regression. We computed logistic growth models for each lineage category in each county using the frequency estimates described above. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁtted a generalized linear model using a binomial distribution to our frequency
estimates in R v4.0.1.
Effective reproduction number. Using p, and the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles from
the Jeffreys interval, we multiplied these values by the number of estimated
infections per day. We estimated infections using the R package covidestim21.
These three potential infection counts were used to calculate the reproduction
number (Rt), the mean number of secondary cases generated by a typical primary
case at time t in a population. Further, for the Rt distribution calculated from p, we
also computed the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles (Supplementary Fig. 2).
Because there is no consensus in the literature as to the precise serial interval for
each variant, we used an uncertain serial interval with mean of 5.2 days and
standard deviation of 4 days33–35. Through the uncertain serial interval, multiple
distributions were explored where the mean was allowed to vary from 2.2 to
8.2 days, and the standard deviation varied from 2.5 to 5.5 days. From each of these
Rt distributions, we selected the median Rt to represent a given lineage’s
instantaneous effective reproductive number per day. All of the Rt estimates were
calculated using the “EpiEstim” package in R v4.0.1.
To evaluate the impact of reporting delays on Rt estimates, we used the R
package ‘EpiNow2’ to estimate Rt assuming 0 to 7 days of reporting delays
(Supplementary Fig. 3).
COVID-19 vaccination rates. We obtained vaccination data for New York City
from data.cdc.gov and for Connecticut from data.ct.gov (COVID-19 Vaccinations
by Town and Age Group).
SARS-CoV-2 genome selection for phylogenetic analysis. We downsampled
both Alpha and Iota datasets using COVID-19 death counts. We elected to normalize
genome counts to the number of deaths because deaths are less likely to be underreported than cases36. We obtained daily death counts for all countries and US states
from the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 portal (https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/
COVID-19). We summed the cumulative number of deaths for each state or country
between October 1, 2020 and April 23, 2021 because we assumed that deaths could
not be attributed to either variant before October 1. Because country-level death data
were not reported for countries within the UK, we calculated the total number of
genomes to sample from the UK with the method described above, and then calculated the distribution of genomes by UK country based on population size. To
calculate the number of genomes we would include in our ﬁnal datasets from each
region, we ﬁrst calculated the ratio of variant genomes to deaths. In doing so, we
assumed that the number of variant genomes sequenced by each country or state was
proportional to the total number of genomes sequenced in those places.
For non-US sampling, if the number of variant genomes sequenced comprised
less than 1% of cumulative deaths, we included all of the genomes from that
location. Otherwise, we selected the number of genomes that corresponded to 1%
8

of reported cumulative deaths. We used a similar approach for US states except we
set the minimum threshold to 0.1% of cumulative deaths. In all cases, if a country
or state had less than 20 genomes available, we included all of them. For the Iota
lineages, we calculated the proportion of each lineage out of the total number of
Iota genomes sequenced in each country or state and selected genomes according
to this proportion.
We did not downsample Connecticut, New York, or New Jersey for either
variant dataset in the ﬁrst stage of downsampling. Once functional duplicates were
removed from these locations, we included 1,408 genomes sequenced by Yale
(Connecticut), 497 sequenced by Jackson Laboratory (Connecticut), and
803 sequenced by the Wadsworth Center (New York City) collected between
December 1, 2020 and April 23, 2021. We obtained all other genomes for this
analysis from GISAID (gisaid.org). We also applied a modiﬁed sampling scheme
for Alpha genomes from Australia, New Zealand, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Vietnam,
or Singapore because these locations reported a negligible number of deaths. For
this reason, it was impossible to downsample based on the number of reported
deaths. We therefore randomly selected 1% of available genomes from those
locations instead. To select the genomes to incorporate into our dataset from the
downsampled locations, we randomly selected a weekly set of genomes equal to 1%
of deaths per week. Using this workﬂow, we generated ﬁve datasets for each variant
to serve as independent replicates for the remainder of our analysis. In all cases, we
excluded genomes containing more than 30% Ns from our selection. Due to the
broader global distribution of Alpha, the datasets for this variant were necessarily
larger than those for Iota.
At that stage, the datasets were still too large to be computationally tractable.
We next scaled each dataset by a factor of 0.1 by randomly selecting 10% of
genomes by country or state (US only). We did not scale genomes from
Connecticut so that the ﬁnal datasets were not precisely one tenth the size of the
original (Supplementary Table 2).

SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic analysis
Sequence alignment and reﬁnement. Having compiled our ten datasets, we aligned
the genomes using MAFFT37. We then removed gaps and masked problematic
sites38. We then removed functional duplicates from each dataset to reduce phylogenetic redundancy. We deﬁned a functional duplicate as genomes that shared
identical sequences, week of collection, and geographic region. For genomes collected in Connecticut and New York, we deﬁned the geographic region as the
county. For genomes collected elsewhere in the US, we deﬁned it as ‘state’. For
genomes collected internationally, we deﬁned the geographic region as ‘country’.
Maximum likelihood construction. To identify and remove problematic genomes
from our datasets, we performed a preliminary phylogenetic analysis in IQTree26.
Each tree was rooted using a P.1 genome (hCoV-19/Brazi/AM-FIOCRUZ20842882CA/2020). We performed a root-to-tip analysis in TempEST39 and
removed outliers with residuals > |0.0015 | . We constructed a maximum likelihood
tree with each dataset (n = 10) using a GTR+G substitution model with 1000
ultrafast bootstraps again with IQTree.
Time-resolved construction. To avoid computational bottlenecks in our phylogeographic reconstruction, we did not use a Bayesian method to infer the temporal
resolution of our maximum likelihood tree. We have previously shown that temporal estimates inferred using TreeTime agree with those inferred from BEAST for
Alpha10. We used the bootstrapped trees and associated alignments to construct
corresponding time-resolved phylogenetic trees with TreeTime v.0.8.022. This
method is implemented in an augur pipeline40.
Discrete phylogeographic analysis. We elected to use a Bayesian approach to infer
geographic ancestral states because we aimed to identify ‘sustained introductions’
of each variant into Connecticut. We deﬁned a sustained introduction as a transition from a non-Connecticut state to a Connecticut state with at least 0.7 posterior probability for the inferred location with clade containing at least 3 tips.
We performed a discrete phylogeographic analysis with the time-resolved trees
as the ﬁxed topology using BEAST23,24. Speciﬁcally, we assigned a location to each
of the tree tips from four categories: ‘Connecticut’, ‘New York/New Jersey’,
‘domestic’, and ‘international’. We used an asymmetric substitution model and a
strict clock to model location. We ran each tree for 1 million chains and used
Tracer v.1.7.1 to conﬁrm that all parameters had achieved ESS values of at
least 200.
We identiﬁed Connecticut-only clades and their source of introduction using
the “exploded tree” script implemented with baltic 0.1.6 (https://github.com/
evogytis/baltic). We restricted our subsequent analysis to clades that represented
sustained introductions. We aggregated the number of sustained introductions by
week and source, and visualized the results using Prism v.9.0.2. We merged the
bootstrap values from our original trees with the topology of our geographicallyresolved trees using baltic.
Statistics and reproducibility. All statistical analyses were performed using R v.4.0.1.
The discrete phylogeographic analysis was completed in 5 replicates per variant
using downsampled subsets of publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genomic data.
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Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability
All of the genomic data used for the analyses in this manuscript are available on GISAID
(gisaid.org). We gratefully acknowledge all of the laboratories that obtained the clinical
specimen and generated the SARS-CoV-2 genomes used in our analyses. All ﬁles
associated with our phylogenetic analysis, including full acknowledgment of the
laboratories whose genomes we used, may be found in our Figshare repository (DOI:
10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.c.5928089).

Code availability
Generalized code used to generate effective reproduction number estimates may be found
in our Github repository (https://github.com/grubaughlab/paper_2021_B117vsB1526;
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6403875).
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